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Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of post-trade transparency on price efficiency and price
discovery.

Design/methodology/approach
The authors use an exogeneous change in market transparency in the Taiwan Stock Exchange that mandates the
disclosure of unexecuted orders of the five best bid and ask prices after each trade, and conduct an event study
analysis.

Findings
After the change, price efficiency enhances for both large and small firms, although the impact on stock prices is
greater when the firm is larger. The authors also find that post-change trading reveals more private information
for large firms but more public information for small firms. The findings support the view that transparency has
a positive impact on market quality.

Originality/value
The paper adds to a large body of literature investigating the relationship between transparency and market
behavior, especially the ongoing debate about whether trading transparency positively affects price dynamics.
The findings also have important policy implications for the regulators.

Keywords
Price discovery, Market microstructure, Opening of limit-order books, Post-trade transparency, Price efficiency

1. Introduction
It is broadly accepted that transparency in equity markets matters for market efficiency and price discovery.
However, the impact of transparency on market quality is complicated (e.g. Paul, 1993; De Frutos and Manzano,
2014; Tang, 2014). One important reason behind the complexity is that transparency has many dimensions such
as corporate disclosure and trading information disclosure. Academic scholars have paid a lot of attention to
issues of transparency concerning disclosure in the trading process. Nevertheless, the findings in the literature
are mixed and far from conclusive. On the positive side, Admati and Pfleiderer (1991) theoretically demonstrate
that sunshine trading can increase the information contained in prices. De Frutos and Manzano (2005) show that
trade disclosure increases the informational efficiency of transaction prices and reduces volatility. On the
negative side, Biais (1993) and De Frutos and Manzano (2002) argue that in more transparent markets, quote
dissemination may have detrimental effects on price efficiency and the welfare of market
participants. Madhavan et al. (2005) find that the disclosure of information on the limit order book to the public
is negatively related to market quality. The third strand of literature suggests that post-trade transparency has
no significant effect on price efficiency and discovery. For example, Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) find that
quote disclosure has little effect on market performance. In this study, motivated by the mixed evidence
documented in the literature, we aim to gain a richer understanding of this important issue by investigating the
impact of post-trade order disclosure on informational efficiency and discovery in the Taiwan Stock Exchange
(TSEC).
The TSEC mandated that beginning January 1, 2003, disclosure of unexecuted orders of the five best bid and ask
prices must be made to the public after each trade. This rule change applies to all stocks traded on the TSEC.
Prior to the rule change, the TSEC disclosed only the best bid/ask along with the transaction price, volume and
orders from the limit-order books. The goal of this change was to enhance the level of market transparency.
Given that this rule change is exogeneous, we use it as a natural experiment to examine the impact of post-trade
transparency on price discovery (how information is impounded into prices) and price efficiency (the
informativeness of prices). To measure price discovery, we follow the framework in Hasbrouck (1991a, b) which
introduce a model based on a vector auto-regression (VAR) in which the nature of information and trading is
inferred from the observed sequence of quotes and trades. In this framework, the variance of price changes is

decomposed into two components: trade-related price movements and trade-unrelated price movements. The
former captures the flow of private information, whereas the latter reflects the incorporation of public
information (e.g. Hendershott et al., 2011). Madhavan (1996) points out that different-sized firms would react
differently to varying transparency conditions. Hence, we divide the sample firms into three groups based on
their market capitalization. Our results indicate that there is an increase in trade-related price movements for
large firms and an increase in trade-unrelated price movements for small firms. In other words, the post-trade
disclosure of unexecuted orders of the five best bid and ask prices in the TSEC leads to greater price discovery:
more private information incorporation for large firms and more public information incorporation for small
firms.
We then follow Amihud et al. (1997) to construct three measures of pricing errors: the relative return dispersion
(RRD), the lagged response, and the firm-specific noise. We then test whether the change in these measures
from the pre-event period to the post-event period are significantly different from zero. Consistent with our
hypothesis that post-trade transparency enhances the informativeness of prices, we find a significant decrease
in all three measures of pricing errors after the TSEC rule change. Taken together, our findings are consistent
with the argument that transparency promotes price efficiency and accelerates stock prices toward their true
value. The post-trade disclosure of unexecuted orders of the five best bid and ask prices after each trade allows
investors to learn more information about trade patterns[1].
Our paper makes several important contributions to the literature. First, our paper adds to a large body of
literature investigating the relationship between transparency and market behavior. Prior studies have
examined how pre-trade visibility of market orders, price setters’ quotes and post-trade speed of reporting
affect price volatility, market liquidity and the welfare of market participants (e.g. Biais, 1993; Pagano and Roell,
1996; De Frutos and Manzano, 2002; Boehmer et al., 2005; Porter and Weaver, 1998). We extend this strand of
literature by documenting that enhanced market transparency because of post-trade disclosure of unexecuted
orders leads to great price discovery and efficiency. Second, our paper contributes to the ongoing debate about
whether trading transparency positively affects price dynamics. Our paper provides some evidence in support of
the positive relation between post-trade transparency and price efficiency and discovery.
Our findings also have some policy implications. Finally, our findings have important policy implications.
Regulatory agencies in different countries have different opinions on the relation between transparency and
market condition. For example, in a speech given in 2014, the SEC chairman reemphasized that “Transparency
has long been a hallmark of the US security markets, and I am concerned by the lack of it in these dark venues.
We must continue to examine whether dark trading volume is approaching a level that risks seriously
undermining the quality of price discovery provided by lit venues.” In contrast, the Securities and Investment
Board in UK believes that to assure adequate market liquidity, trading transparency should be restricted when it
comes to prompt publication of large trades. It is important to point out that although the rule change in TSEC
was 15 years ago, it is still valuable to evaluate the event today for the following reasons. First, the TSEC is a
purely electronic and automated trading system, and its experience of increased post-trade transparency offers
a blueprint for other markets with similar structure around the world which consider the adoption of similar
rules in the future. Second, exogeneous regulatory change in transparency is very rare, thus the empirical
evidence on market quality is sparse. Examination of increased post-trade transparency in the TSEC is thus
valuable and would enrich the existing literature. Third, the discussion of increased transparency has
accelerated since the financial crisis, but it has not yet been determined whether increased transparency
necessarily improves market outcomes. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an
institutional background of the TSEC; Section 3 discusses related literature and hypothesis development; Section
4 discusses data sources and the sample; Section 5 discusses the research methodology. The empirical results
are provided in Section 6. The conclusion is in the final section.

2. Institutional background of the TSEC
The TSEC is a pure order-driven market with no designated market makers, specialists or dealers. Essentially, it is
a fully computerized trading system. The TSEC trades from 9:00 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. five weekdays days a week,
except on national holidays. Although investors can submit their orders to the system starting at 8:30 a.m., they
are not executed until 9:00 a.m. The TSEC sets the stocks’ opening prices by matching the largest amount of bid
and ask orders in the limit-order books. After the market opens, the trading rules are as follows: first, the
investors’ orders are matched by bid-ask price first and then by order submission time; second, the setting price
in each call is where the largest number of shares can be traded; third, all bid orders above the setting price and
all ask orders below the setting price are executed, with the unexecuted orders kept for the next call; fourth,
orders in limit-order books are batched over various time intervals, which depend on the trading situation, but
average 45 s for each trading cycle; fifth, in the last 5 min (1:25–1:30), only one call is issued, and the setting
price is the closing price for that day; and sixth, a price limit of ±10 percent from the previous trading day’s close
price is imposed. The price limit rule is applied to the open price, the closing price and the transaction price
during the middle of the trading session (9:00–13:25).
The January 1, 2003, event leading to the increase in transparency is a key institutional characteristic of the
TSEC. Before this date, the TSEC disclosed only the best bid/ask after each trade along with the transaction
prices, volume and orders from the limit-order books. Since that date, the TSEC now discloses unexecuted
orders of the five best bid/ask prices. TSEC officials argued that this change would promote transparency[2].
Individuals are the major investors on the TSEC. According to the TSEC’s annual reports, the percentage of
trading volume by individuals to total market volume was 70–80 percent for the years 2002 and 2003,
respectively. However, because the market was opened to foreign institutional investors, this percentage has
gradually decreased. By 2014, the percentage fell to 58.80 percent, with the majority still being retail investors.

3. Related literature and hypothesis development
Our paper is closely related to a body of research that examines how trading transparency affects price
dynamics. On the positive side, Admati and Pfleiderer (1991) theoretically demonstrate that sunshine trading
can increase the information contained in prices. Baruch (2005) shows that more information is revealed by
price in an open limit-order book situation. Boehmer et al. (2005) find that the introduction of the NYSE’s
OpenBook service, which provides limit-order book information to traders off the exchange floor, affects
investors’ trading strategies and improves the price efficiency. De Frutos and Manzano (2005) show that trade
disclosure increases the informational efficiency of transaction prices and reduces volatility. De Frutos and
Manzano (2014) further show that in competitive markets, pre-trade information disclosure on the composition
of the order flow enhances market quality. One closely related paper is Ke et al. (2013) who find that the posttrade disclosure of unexecuted orders of the five best bid and ask prices in TSEC increases market liquidity. In
contrast, our paper focuses on the impact of post-trade transparency on the informativeness of prices (price
efficiency) and how information is incorporated into prices (price discovery).
One the negative side, Madhavan (1996) shows that disclosing information about the composition of order flows
can reduce price efficiency. Biais (1993) and De Frutos and Manzano (2002) argue that in more transparent
markets, quote dissemination may have detrimental effects on price efficiency and the welfare of market
participants. They also found that less information is impounded into a price in an opaque market, reducing
transaction price efficiency. Madhavan, Porter and Weaver (2005) find that the disclosure of information on the
limit order book to the public is negatively related to market quality. Naik et al. (1999) conduct an experimental
study and find that the full and prompt disclosure of first-stage trade details may reduce the welfare of market
participants.

In addition, there could be no relation between market transparency and stock price dynamics. For example, in
an experimental study, Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) find that quote disclosure has little effect on market
performance. Given the inconsistency of predictions derived from the literature, the following hypotheses are
tested:
H1. Disclosure of post-trade unexecuted orders has no effect on efficiency.
H2. Disclosure of post-trade unexecuted orders has no effect on price discovery.

4. Data and sample
In this study, real-time transaction data and daily data from the TSEC for the period from September 1, 2002 to
April 30, 2003, are used. All data are retrieved from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database. We place
several filters to obtain the final sample: first, firms in the sample must be listed over the sample period.
Observations with nonpositive bid/ask price or nonpositive bid-ask spread are deleted. Second, we delete stocks
with missing trading data. Third, trades and quotes that have been time-stamped outside the regular TSEC
trading time are also excluded. Fourth, foreign firms are not included in the sample. Last, if the average stock
price of a stock during the sample period is less than $10 NTD, then the stock is deleted. Low priced stocks have
the issue of non-synchronicity because these stocks are usually very thin. Our final sample includes 315 firms
and 6,312,788 intraday observations. Each observation includes the firm code, date, time, transaction price,
transaction volume, and best bid and ask prices.
Firms listed on the TSEC are sorted into three groups based on their 2001 year-end capitalization. The top tercile
includes firms with the largest capitalization stocks, while the bottom tercile is comprised of firms with the
smallest capitalization stocks. To well examine the impact of transparency on market quality and make a sharp
comparison, we only keep stocks in top and bottom terciles. There are 105 large firms and 105 small firms in our
sample. The capitalizations are 8,244–1,472,848 and 203–2,837m NTD for large and small stocks, respectively.
Our sample firms are distributed across various industries and are representative of the stock market.
The event day – when the TSEC began to disclose the best five bids/asks with orders in its limit-order books – is
naturally January 1, 2003. The period, from September 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002, is called the estimation
period (before the event); the period, from January 1, 2003 to April 30, 2003, is called the event period (after
the event). During our sample period, no other major events in the TSEC has occurred, allowing us to compare
the market quality for the same stocks traded in the same market but at different transparency levels.
Table I contains descriptive statistics for the sample of all, large and small firms, respectively. The characteristics
of the average daily closing price, average daily volatility, average daily trading shares and average daily market
value are reported. When examining the stocks in each portfolio, we find that large firms have bigger values
than small firms in all fields. For example, the average trading share for large firms is 12,502, while it is 849 for
small firms. According to TSEC statistics, institutional investors prefer large-firm stocks over small-firm stocks
and as a result, the trading of large firms is more intensive than the trading of small firms[3].

5. Methodology
In this section, we discuss the measures of price efficiency and price discovery.

5.1 Efficiency
Following Amihud et al. (1997), we use the dispersion of individual stock around market return to measure
pricing errors. For day t, the RRD is calculated by:

𝑛

1
RRD𝑡 = ∑ 𝜀𝑖𝑡2 ,
𝑛
𝑖=1

where εit is the market model residual of stock i on day t, and n is the number of stocks. The differences
between pre-event RRD and post-event RRD indicate the change in efficiency driven by the change in
transparency. In the lag market model, there are two factors that may be used to measure inefficiency: lag
response and firm-specific noise. The lag market model is formulated as follows:

𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 RM𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 RM𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the return for stock i at day t; RM𝑡 and RM𝑡−1indicate the market returns for
day t and t−1, respectively; the coefficient 𝛾𝑖 is the lag response; and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the residual whose variance
denoted by var (ε), which is a proxy for firm-specific noise. The model is estimated separately over the
periods before and after the event[4]. The higher the values of RRD, the lag response, and firm-specific
noise, the less price efficiency.

5.2 Price discovery
We follow the model in Hasbrouck (1991b) to infer the components of price discovery surrounding the
event of January 1, 2003. Following this model, all stock price movements are assigned to one of two
categories: one is associated with trade (trade-related), and the other is unassociated with trade
(quote-related). Following Hendershott et al. (2011), the price movements are considered to release
private information if they are associated with trades; otherwise they are considered to reflect public
information if they are orthogonal to trades. The full model is as follows[5]:
∞

∞

𝑟𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑖 𝑟𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖 𝑥𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑟𝑡 ,
𝑖=1

𝑖=0

∞

∞

𝑥𝑡 = ∑ 𝛿𝑖 𝑟𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜂𝑖 𝑥𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑥𝑡
𝑖=1

𝑖=1

In model (3), the first equation formulates the trade-by-trade evolution of the bid-ask midpoint; the
second one indicates the persistence of the order flow. The xjt is an indicator variable for stock j in
trade t (+1 for buying; −1 for selling), and rjt is the log return based on the bid-ask midpoint for
stock j in trade t, while var(𝜀𝑟𝑡 ) = 𝜎𝑟2 , var(𝜀𝑥𝑡 ) = 𝜎𝑥2 are assumed to be held[6],[7].Using tick-by-tick
data, we estimate these two equations by taking ordinary least squares (OLS) for each day and each
stock. Under some assumptions, the vector auto-regression (VAR) form of Equation (3) can be inverted
into a vector moving average (VMA) representation:

𝑦𝑡 = [𝑟𝑡 𝑥𝑡 ] = [𝑎(𝐿)𝑏(𝐿)𝑑(𝐿)𝑒(𝐿)][𝜀𝑟𝑡 𝜀𝑥𝑡 ].
Following Hasbrouck (1991b), a(L), b(L), d(L) and e(L) are the lag polynomial operators. The sum
of a(L)εrt+b(L)εxt is the permanent impact of an innovation on the price. Assuming cov(εrt, εxt) = 0, the
variance of the random-walk component can be written as follows:

∞

2

∞

2

𝜎𝜔2 = (∑ 𝑎𝑖 ) 𝜎𝑟2 + (∑ 𝑏𝑖 ) 𝜎𝑥2 .
𝑖=0

𝑖=0

As in Hasbrouck (1991b), the first term of Equation (5) measures the component of the price discovery
that is unrelated to trading, and the second term captures the part of the price discovery that is related
to the recent trade. The sum of the first term and the second term is called the price discovery or the
efficient price change.
To better understand the differences in the price discovery around the rule change in the TSEC, we
follow the methodology in Hendershott et al. (2011) and Riordan and Storkenmaier (2012) and run a
panel regression with control variables. The control variables include: stock price, which is the natural
log of the average trading price for stock i on day t; shares, which is the natural log of the trading
shares for stock i on day t; and market value, which is the natural log of market value for stock i on
day t. The regression model is:
3

𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 Dummy𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛹𝐾 Controls𝑖,𝑡,𝐾 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,
𝐾=1

where Li,t is the cumulative impulse response, trade-related standard deviation, quote-related standard
deviation, and price discovery for stock i on day t; Dummyi,t is a dummy variable, with a value of 0 if before the
event and 1 otherwise; εi,t is an error term, assuming it follows classical rules; and Controlsi,t,κ are the control
factors. The firm fixed effects are also included.

6. Empirical findings
6.1 Improvements in price efficiency
We examine whether the price efficiency exhibits significant changes around the event of the TSEC rule
change. The pattern of RRDs is shown in Figures 1–3. We find that the market becomes more efficient
after the rule change for both large and small firms. For example, for total (large, small) firms, the
average RRDs is 3.71 (3.65, 3.77) during the pre-event period, while the value decreases to 2.92 (2.72,
3.13) in the post-event period – a difference of −0.79 (−0.93, −0.64); the corresponding T-value is −6.82
(−5.43, −4.23). At the same time, RRDs begins to decrease, and becomes more concentrated about 30
days after the event day. This phenomenon suggests that investors adjust their behaviors gradually,
not immediately, to changes in market conditions.
We next examine two other factors: the lag response and the firm-specific noise. The results are shown
in Table II. There is a significant decrease in both the lag response and firm-specific noise after the
transparency event. For example, the lag response of large (small) firms decreased from 0.046 (0.095)
to −0.015(0.035), and the firm-specific noise decreased from 5.456 (5.765) to 4.325 (5.013). The
decrease in lag response means that investors are adjusting their behaviors to market information
faster than before, inducing stock prices to promptly react to new information. The decrease of firmspecific noise after the event implies either a reduction in price error or that more firm-specific
information is incorporated into the stock price more precisely. Overall, H1 is rejected as the market
becomes more efficient following the opening of limit-order books.

6.2 Improvements in price discovery
Table III shows the cumulative impulse response, which is viewed as the permanent price impact of a
trade and is usually interpreted as indicating the private information content of a trade. Although the
cumulative impulse response is shown to decrease post-event for firms overall, it increases for large
firms and decreases for small firms. There are two components to price discovery: trade-related price
movements and quote-related price movements. The former relates to private information while the
latter connects to public information. Table III shows that the trade-related standard deviation
increases after the rule change, while the quote-related standard deviation decreases for firms overall,
but the impact varies across firms with different sizes. Price discovery itself increases for firms overall,
decreases for large firms, and increases for small firms after the event.
We also use the panel regression method to test the differences in the cumulative impulse response,
trade-related standard deviation, quote-related standard deviation, and price discovery around the
event. The regression results are shown in Table IV. First, for firms overall, the differences in all four
measures are not significant. Further, large firms and small firms are separately examined. There is a
significant increase in the cumulative impulse response and the trade-related standard deviation for
large firms after the event, while the quote-related standard deviation decreases. In Table IV Panel B,
after controlling for the impact of confounding factors such as stock turnover and momentum, we
continue to find similar results. It is noteworthy that for the whole sample, the price discovery
increases after the rule change. For small firms, there is a significant increase in the quote-related
standard deviation and price discovery, while the other measures do not change significantly. The
increase in the quote-related standard deviation indicates that more public information is incorporated
into stock prices in a timely manner after the rule change[8]. The possible reason for the insignificance
of increase in small stocks could be due to adverse selection, individual investors in small firms are less
likely to be exploited by institutional investors whose trading likely carries private information.
The increase in price discovery measures indicates that the impact of transparency is beneficial to price
discovery for small firms. While for large firms, the change in price discovery is not significant, the rule
change lead to more private information incorporation into stock prices. The overall results suggest
that post-trade transparency in the TSEC affects the components of price discovery and price discovery
itself, but the impacts are different for differently sized firms. In an untabulated analysis, to provide
more direct evidence on how post-trade transparency affects price dynamics, we also examine the
institutional trading frequency around the rule change in TSEC. Literature has provided ample evidence
that institutional investors are at an advantageous position in collecting and trading private
information. For example, Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) find that institutional trading is positively
associated with stock price informativeness. Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that institutional investors
contribute to private information collection and trading. Therefore, more frequent institutional trading
indicates more private information incorporation. We find that after the rule change in 2003,
institutional investors trade more often in large stocks, but not small stocks. This can explain why the
post-trade transparency affects stocks of different sizes in a varying manner.

7. Conclusion
Transparency is important to all participants in the stock market. Most previous research has primarily
focused on the impact of pre-trade transparency on market quality, whereas this study empirically
investigates the impact of enhanced post-trade transparency due to the exogenous rule change in the
TWSE that mandates the disclosure of unexecuted orders of the five best bid and ask prices after each
trade.
Several findings emerge from this analysis. Consistent with the assumption of regulators and policy
makers, greater transparency upgrades market efficiency for both large and small firms and implies
that investors impound information into stock prices faster than before. For price discovery,
transparency impacts the stock prices of large firms more than that of small firms. Additionally, trade
reveals more private information for the large firms, whereas it generally conveys public information in
a more timely manner for small firms.
Our findings are consistent with the theoretical argument that traders adjust their trading behavior
depending on the level of transparency. The evidence in this paper supports the view that greater
transparency has a positive impact on market quality.

Figures

Figure 1 Relative return dispersion (All firms)

Figure 2 Relative return dispersion (Large firms)

Figure 3 Relative return dispersion (Small firms)

Table I Descriptive statistics from the Taiwan Stock Exchange
Price
Volatility
Trading shares (in thousands)
Market value (in millions)
Number of stocks

All firms
28.54
1.01
6,676
31,033
210

Large firms
37.08
1.32
12,502
60,242
105

Small firms
20.00
0.70
849
1,824
105

Notes: This table reports the mean values of daily closing price, volatility (the highest price minus the
lowest price each day), daily traded shares (in thousands), and daily market value (in millions) for all
stocks and for two sub-sample stocks. We sorted the firms listed on the TSEC based on their 2001 yearend capitalization and divided them equally into three groups. The top tercile (large firms) includes
stocks with the largest capitalization, and the bottom tercile (small firms) is comprised of stocks with
the smallest capitalization. Numbers reported are during the period September 1, 2002 to April 30,
2003

Table II Efficiency change around the event
Measures of efficiency
Large firms
Mean-before event
Mean-after event
Diff.
(t-value)
Small firms
Mean-before event
Mean-after event
Diff.
(t-value)

Lag response (γ)

Firm-specific noise (var(ε))

0.046
−0.015
−0.061
(−3.05***)

5.456
4.325
−1.131
(−4.82***)

0.095
0.035
−0.060
(−2.96***)

5.765
5.013
−0.752
(−2.68***)

Notes: The market model Rit=αi+βi.RMt+γi RMt−1+εit is estimated using the OLS firm by firm before and
after the transparency event. Here, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the daily return on stock i on day t; RMt is the market return
on day t; εit is the residual term; and αi is the intercept term. The βi and γ are the coefficients of current
market return and lag market return, respectively. The pre-event period is from September 1, 2001 to
December 31, 2002. The post-event period is from January 2, 2003 to April 30, 2003. There are 105
large firms and 105 small firms in our sample. The means of the estimated coefficient γ and the
variance of residual term are calculated across all firms. Differences that are significantly different from
0 are denoted by *,**,***Significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively

Table III Descriptive statistics for price discovery
Variables
Panel A:
overall
Before event
After event
Diff.
Panel B: large
firms
Before event
After event
Diff.
Panel C: small
firms
Before event
After event
Diff.

Cumulative impulse
response (1)

Trade-related standard
deviation (2)

Quote-related standard
deviation (3)

Price
discovery (4)

16.09
15.71
−0.48
0.02

7.79
12.45
4.66
3.58***

60.89
59.25
−1.46
1.06

68.68
71.70
3.02
1.67

3.86
5.73
1.87
(2.74***)

3.30
4.97
1.67
(3.03***)

77.28
64.99
−12.29
(−3.15***)

80.58
69.96
−10.62
(−3.02***)

32.51
31.20
−1.31
(0.07)

13.82
24.07
10.25
(1.38)

38.89
50.34
11.45
(1.92*)

52.71
74.40
21.69
(2.85***)

Notes: This table reports the trade-related standard deviation, quote-related standard deviation, and
the sum of the both for the pre-event and post-event period. The period before the event ranges from
September 1, 2001 to December 31, 2002. The post-event period ranges from January 2, 2003 to April
30, 2003. The numbers in the table are the means before and after the event, respectively. The unit is

the basis point. There are 105 large firms and 105 small firms in our sample. In parentheses are tvalues, and symbols **,***Mean significant at 5 and 1 percent significance levels, respectively

Table IV Panel regressions for price discovery
Dependent
variable
Panel A: fixed
effects
Panel A: overall
Dummy
estimate
t-value
Panel B: large
firms
Dummy
estimate
t-value
Panel C: small
firms
Dummy
estimate
t-value
Panel B: control
variables
Panel A: overall
Dummy
estimate
t-value
Panel B: large
firms
Dummy
estimate
t-value
Panel C: small
firms
Dummy
estimate
t-value

Cumulative impulse
response (1)

Trade-related
standard deviation (2)

Quote-related
standard deviation (3)

Price
discovery (4)

−4.70

3.99

2.68

6.67

(−0.59)

(1.33)

(1.01)

(1.54)

2.17

1.99

−4.70

−2.70

(2.99***)

(3.32***)

(−1.88)

(−1.00)

−10.50

8.65

15.05

23.70

(−0.54)

(1.20)

(2.80***)

(2.45**)

−4.70

4.12

2.84

6.96

(−0.59)

(1.33)

(1.34)

(1.89*)

3.30

3.01

−6.60

−3.59

(4.89***)

(5.40***)

(−1.88)

(−1.12)

2.46

10.70

17.30

28.00

(0.13)

(1.48)

(3.24***)

(2.67**)

Notes: This table reports the panel regression results for the trade-related standard deviation, quoterelated standard deviation, and the sum of the both. The panel regressions are performed on daily
measures for each stock. The period before the event ranges from September 1, 2001 to December 31,
2002. The post-event period ranges from January 2, 2003 to April 30, 2003. The Panel A model is:
Σit=αi+βVOt+γDt+εi,t. The Σ is trade-related standard deviation, quote-related standard deviation, or the
sum of them. VO is market-wide volatility, which is measured as the highest price minus the lowest
price each day. D is a dummy variable whose value is 1 if after the event, otherwise 0. The Panel B
model is:

4

∑ = 𝛼 + 𝛽VO𝑡 + 𝛾𝐷𝑡 + ∑ 𝜑𝑘 Contrls𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 .
𝑖𝑡

𝑘=1

The Contrls are control variables, including the logarithm of daily price, logarithm of daily turnover
rate, daily volatility (the highest price minus the lowest price for each day), logarithm of market
capitalization, book-to-market ratio and momentum. In panel A model, the fixed effects are
considered. In Panel B, the control variables are included. The unit is the basis point. There are 105
large firms and 105 small firms in our sample. *,**,***Significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent levels,
respectively

Notes
1.Eom et al. (2007) find that traders will adjust their investment behaviors in response to changes in
transparency and then the adjustment of investment behaviors impacts the quality of markets.
2.See TSEC’s 2003 Fact Book.
3.Literature has shown institutional investors prefer large stocks. For example, using the US stock market
data, Gompers and Metrick (2001) find institutional investors increase demand for the stock of large
companies and decrease demand for the stock of small companies. Ferreira and Matos (2008) examine
the role of institutional investors around the world (27 countries) and find that all institutional investors,
whatever their geographic origin, share a preference for the stock of large and widely held firms.
4.In an alternative specification, in Equation (2) we also control other variables such as market capitalization,
book-to-market ratio, the cumulative returns in the last three month and stock turnover.
5.Following Hasbrouck (1991b), the lagging three periods are employed.
6.The stock subscript j is omitted from now on.
7.We follow Lee and Ready’s (1991) procedure to compare traded price with quotes. If the traded price is larger
than the midpoint of the bid and ask quotes, then it is assumed that the transaction is initiated by the
buyer and the value of xjt is 1. If the traded price is smaller than the midpoint of the bid and ask quotes,
then it is thought that the transaction is initiated by the seller and the value of xjt is −1.
8.Public information is not always reflected into stock prices immediately. For example, using the US stock
market data, Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) and Drake et al. (2012) argue that new information in public
disclosures is not impounded into stock prices instantaneously but rather is disseminated to investors
gradually due to investors’ limited attention and the significant information processing costs. While
institutions may have better resources for obtaining private information, they are still constrained by
limited financial resources and attention span. Thus, institutions must optimize their information
acquisition activities because of the costs of information acquisition as predicted by Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980).
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